Professional Security Service
Active Directory Security Assessment
A scoped review of Active Directory identity controls and realistic privilege paths, with non-destructive validation and prioritized hardening guidance.
Request a QuoteWhat This Covers
Domain and forest configuration, trusts and administrative tiering
Privileged groups, delegated rights and access-control relationships
Kerberos, NTLM, service accounts and credential exposure paths
Group Policy and security-control configuration
Active Directory Certificate Services where included in scope
Workstation, server and identity paths that may enable lateral movement
Hybrid Active Directory and Microsoft Entra ID boundaries where included
Stale identities, legacy protocols and excessive standing privilege
How We Test
Testing begins with written authorization, rules of engagement and safety constraints. Discovery is review-first, and attack paths are validated only to the level authorized and necessary to demonstrate risk.
1Confirm objectives, identity boundaries, accounts, systems and prohibited actions
2Review architecture, trust relationships and available configuration evidence
3Perform authenticated enumeration using the least privilege agreed for the engagement
4Map privilege, delegation, session and credential relationships
5Validate selected attack paths with controlled, non-destructive proof
6Prioritize findings by exploitability, blast radius and business impact
7Deliver remediation guidance and verify agreed fixes during re-testing
Deliverables
Executive summary explaining material identity and privilege risks
Technical findings with affected principals, systems and evidence
Attack-path narrative showing how control weaknesses can combine
Prioritized hardening plan with practical remediation steps
Configuration and detection recommendations
Re-test results for agreed remediated findings
Engagement Options
1
Configuration review focused on identity hygiene and hardening2
Assumed-breach assessment from an agreed internal foothold3
Internal privilege and attack-path validation4
Hybrid identity review covering agreed AD and Entra ID boundariesTypical Findings
Excessive group membership or delegated directory permissions
Service accounts exposed to offline credential attacks
Stale privileged accounts and weak administrative tier separation
Insecure delegation or trust configuration
Legacy authentication protocols and weak signing requirements
GPO permissions or settings that create escalation paths
Risky certificate templates or AD CS permissions
Insufficient segmentation of administrative sessions and systems
Frequently Asked Questions
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